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NOTE
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION: A WRONG
WITHOUT A RIGHT
I. INTRODUCTION
As America caught its collective breath on the morning of Sep-
tember 12, 2001, many undoubtedly realized that the prior day's
events had ushered in a new era in our nation's history. Few,
however, would have guessed exactly what that new era would
entail over the coming years. A year and a half later, the United
States would be engulfed in several wars: Afghanistan, Iraq, and
the broader war against terror. The last was perhaps the most
unsurprising in the aftermath of 9/11. However, engaging in this
new, amorphous war would be unlike anything we as a country
had faced before. This war against terror would consist of extrem-
ists armed with improvised explosives and fanatical religious be-
liefs who were far more nimble than traditional opponents. Fac-
ing this new landscape, the United States needed to change its
tactics-drastically.
Congress granted the President sweeping powers to combat
this new and unexpected threat,1 and allies offered generous sup-
port.2 But some of the most far-reaching-and questionable-
1. See Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required
to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115
Stat. 272 (2001) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.) (reforming sur-
veillance, money-laundering, terrorist, and intelligence laws); see also Authorization for
Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §
1541 note (2006) (Congressional authorization "to use all necessary and appropriate force
against" terrorist organizations or nations involved in the 9/11 attacks).
2. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) (U.N. Security
Council Resolution condemning attacks, offering sympathies, calling on members to "re-
double their efforts" to combat terrorism, and expressing "readiness to take all necessary
steps to respond to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001").
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tactics were carried out in private. As Cofer Black, then-director
of the Counterterrorist Center of the Central Intelligence Agency
("CIA") later put it, "there was a 'before' 9/11 and 'after' 9/11. Af-
ter 9/11 the gloves came off."3 On September 17, 2001, just six
days after the attacks, George W. Bush signed a presidential find-
ing authorizing the CIA to disrupt terrorist activity and capture,
detain, and interrogate Al-Qaeda leaders.' A week later, John
Yoo, a lawyer in the Justice Department's Office of Legal Coun-
sel, drafted the first of his now infamous legal memoranda, ex-
plaining the President's broad constitutional powers in wartime.5
In these early days the executive branch took many more steps
that would define the new era we had entered in our war against
terror.
One of these new classified tactics only came to public light
several years later. In 2005, journalists revealed that the CIA
was holding top-level terrorist leaders in secret prisons around
the world-an interconnected global web of "black sites" located
from the Middle East to Thailand.6 Further, they reported, some
suspected terrorists were "captured" and delivered to foreign
countries' intelligence services-Egypt, Jordan, Syria, and Moroc-
co, for example-through a CIA-facilitated process called "rendi-
tion."7 All of these countries, they noted, had a track record of tor-
ture.8 When the story of this rendition procedure more fully
worked itself into the public eye, the process took on a new
name-extraordinary rendition.9
3. Joint Inquiry Into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist
Attacks of September 11, 2001: Hearing Before the J. Inquiry of S. Select Comm. on Intelli-
gence and H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, 107th Cong. 590 (2002) [hereinafter
Hearing on Intelligence Community Activities] (testimony of Cofer Black, Director of the
Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency).
4. Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, At a Secret Interrogation, Dispute Flared Over
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10, 2006, § 1, at 1.
5. Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal
Counsel, to Tim Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President (Sept. 25, 2001), available at
http://www.torturingdemocracy.org/documents/20010925.pdf. For an accessible collection
of the relevant memoranda that have been released, see George Washington University,
The Interrogation Documents: Debating U.S. Policy and Methods, http://www.gwu.edu/-
nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB127/ (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
6. See, e.g., Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America's "Ex-
traordinary Rendition" Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14, 2005, at 106; Dana Priest, CIA
Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al.
7. Mayer, supra note 6.
8. Id.
9. While the term "extraordinary rendition" had been used before, it now primarily
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This process has since come under intense scrutiny not only for
its questionable morality, but also for its questionable legality.
Many academics, commentators, critics, and victims claim the
CIA is violating clearly established international law, including
the United States' treaty obligations and principles of customary
international law.' ° While the international reaction has been
swift, it has failed to hold the United States accountable and pro-
vide meaningful redress for the victims of extraordinary rendi-
tion.11 As a result, several released extraordinary rendition vic-
tims have taken their cases to United States courts seeking
redress for these violations of international law.12 These federal
lawsuits, however, have all been quickly dismissed for a variety of
reasons other than the merits of the cases. 3 Dismissal of these
suits showcases not only the lack of redress for the victims, but
also brings squarely to light the ever-present tension among indi-
viduals' rights, the government's obligation to keep secret its
clandestine national security missions, and international law's
broad principles that encompass the extraordinary rendition
process.
Part II of this note will address the development and modern-
day incarnation of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program.
Part III will provide the background of the legal principles in-
volved, including the international customary norm prohibiting
torture and the Convention Against Torture. After reviewing this
background material, Part IV will document the international re-
sponse to the extraordinary rendition program, noting the lack of
meaningful accountability on the international and institutional
levels. Part V will then turn to the last resort for many victims-
the United States judicial system. It will highlight the most via-
ble existing cause of action in this context, the Alien Tort Statute,
and the numerous legal obstacles that victims face when turning
to this forum. Finally, Part VI will briefly propose a threefold so-
lution to the legal obstacles victims encounter in domestic courts.
The proposal involves a distinct role for each branch of govern-
ment to ensure that each reinforces the rule of law while acting
as a check on the others.
refers to the extrajudicial transfers discussed in this note.
10. See infra notes 61-74 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Parts V.B.3-4.
13. See id.
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II. EXTRAORDINARY RENDITION
Rendition itself is by no means a novel concept. It simply
means "It]he return of a fugitive from one state to the state where
the fugitive is accused or convicted of a crime."14 Rendition-or
extradition, which is interchangeable in many instances'-has
long existed in the United States. 6 As far back as George Wash-
ington's presidency, the legal principles applicable to extradition
have been analyzed. 7 Most of this analysis, however, focused on
the United States' extradition of individuals from our soil to other
countries, and which branch of government had the power to au-
thorize extradition."8 While those legal principles remain, some
renditions changed significantly in later years and forced an ex-
amination of other principles.
The first shift involved the use of international kidnapping to
bring individuals to the United States for trial. 9 While it had
been used for some time, this method became a more important
tool in the latter half of the twentieth century.2" The Supreme
Court implicitly approved this method as recently as 1992 when
it reaffirmed the Ker doctrine," which maintains that "the power
of a court to try a person for [a] crime is not impaired by the fact
that he ha[s] been brought within the court's jurisdiction by rea-
son of a 'forcible abduction.' 22
14. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1322 (8th ed. 2004).
15. See id. at 623 ("The official surrender of an alleged criminal by one state or nation
to another having jurisdiction over the crime charged; the return of a fugitive from justice,
regardless of consent, by the authorities where the fugitive is found."); see also Louis Fish-
er, Extraordinary Rendition: The Price of Secrecy, 57 AM. U. L. REV. 1405, 1407 (2008)
("Rendition often seems indistinguishable from the definition of extradition.").
16. See generally Fisher, supra note 15, at 1406-12 (reviewing various historical legal
analyses of extradition in the United States).
17. See id. at 1407 ("In a letter to President George Washington in 1791, Secretary of
State Thomas Jefferson discussed the legal principles that guided the delivery of fugitives
from one country to another.").
18. See id. at 1406-12.
19. See COMM. ON INT'L HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE AsS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y.
& CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, TORTURE BY
PROXY: INTERNATIONAL AND DOMESTIC LAW APPLICABLE TO "EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS"
15 (2004) [hereinafter TORTURE BY PROXY], available at http://www.chrgj.orgtdocs/Torture
ByProxy.pdf.
20. See id.
21. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 660-62 (1992) (applying Ker
v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 442-44 (1886)).
22. Id. at 661 (quoting Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522 (1952)).
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This method of rendition, however useful, did not quite provide
the United States with what it wanted or needed when faced with
the new terrorist threat of A1-Qaeda in the mid-1990s. Thus, the
seeds of the CIA's modern-day rendition program were only re-
cently planted. According to Michael Scheuer, the former chief of
the CIA's Bin Laden Unit, in the summer of 1995, President Clin-
ton "requested that the CIA begin to attack and dismantle al-
Qaeda."23 But the United States did not want to bring suspected
terrorists to America anymore; instead, it wanted to rely on other
countries' legal processes to detain those it determined to be a
threat to American interests.24 Under Scheuer's leadership, the
CIA's Bin Laden Unit was to "take each captured al-Qaeda leader
to the country which had an outstanding legal process for him."25
Scheuer maintains this was a "hard-and-fast rule," which would
comport with the traditionally accepted notion of a rendition to
justice.26 It worked well for all involved. The initial renditions be-
23. Extraordinary Rendition in U.S. Counterterrorism Policy: The Impact on Transat-
lantic Relations: J. Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Organizations, Human
Rights, and Oversight and the Subcomm. on Europe of the H. Comm. on Foreign Affairs,
110th Cong. 12 (2007) [hereinafter Extraordinary Rendition Hearing] (statement of Mi-
chael F. Scheuer, former Chief of Bin Laden Unit, Central Intelligence Agency).
24. See id.; see also Eur. Parl. Ass., Report of the Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human
Rights, 13th Sess., Doc. No. 10957 (2006), at 15 [hereinafter Comm. on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights Report], available at http://assembly.coe.intDocumentsWorkingDocs/doc
06/edoc10957.pdf ("The central effect of the post-9/11 rendition programme has been to
place captured terrorist suspects outside the reach of any justice system and keep them
there."). The purpose of keeping suspected terrorists outside the reach of the United States
legal system was clear to those involved:
According to an unnamed senior U.S. intelligence official there have been "a
lot of rendition activities" since September 11, 2001: "We are doing a number
of them, and they have been very productive." Similarly, in an interview with
the Washington Post, an unnamed U.S. diplomat acknowledged that "[aifter
September 11, [renditions] have been occurring all the time .... It allows us
to get information from terrorists in a way we can't do on U.S. soil." Accord-
ing to another unnamed official, "[tihe temptation is to have these folks in
other hands because they have different standards." "Someone might be able
to get information we can't from detainees," said another. Another unnamed
official who has been involved in rendering captives into foreign hands ex-
plained his understanding of the purpose of Extraordinary Renditions: "We
don't kick the [expletive] out of them. We send them to other countries so
they can kick the [expletive] out of them."
TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 19, at 13 (alterations in original) (internal citations omit-
ted).
25. Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 12 (statement of Michael F.
Scheuer).
26. See id.; see also TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 19, at 15 ("On the record, U.S.
government officials acknowledge only the existence of the practice of 'rendition to justice'.
... In the early 1990s, renditions to justice were allegedly exclusively law enforcement
operations in which suspects were apprehended by covert CIA or FBI teams and brought
20091 1139
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gan after an agreement with Egypt, which authorized the United
States to "actively seek out and render Egypt's most wanted pris-
oners back to Cairo" for interrogation or imprisonment.27 This col-
laborative effort allowed the United States to facilitate the cap-
ture of suspected and convicted terrorists abroad, not only getting
them "off the streets," but also returning them to other countries
for interrogation, trial, or sentencing.2" When faced with the same
issue now in focus-whether those rendered would be tortured
once they were returned-Scheuer contends that the CIA sought
assurances from the receiving country that the prisoner would be
treated in accordance with the receiving country's own laws.29 De-
spite most of the receiving countries' records as human rights ab-
users, the CIA rendered suspected terrorists and Al-Qaeda lead-
ers to such countries.3 ° According to then-CIA director George
Tenet, the CIA executed roughly eighty of these renditions in the
years leading up to 9/11.31
After 9/11, the "gloves came off." Within days, President Bush
had authorized the CIA to render suspected terrorists to third-
party countries solely for detention and interrogation.32 "This de-
cision by the Bush Administration allowed [the] CIA to capture
al-Qaeda fighters we knew were a threat to the United States
without on all occasions being dependent on the availability of
another country's outstanding legal process."33 According to un-
named officials, through a still-classified presidential directive,
to the United States or other states (usually the states having an interest in bringing the
person to justice) for trial or questioning.").
27. STEPHEN GREY, GHOST PLANE: THE TRUE STORY OF THE CIA TORTURE PROGRAM
140 (2006); see also TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 19, at 9 (documenting mid-1990s ren-
ditions to Egypt).
28. See Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Report, supra note 24, at 13.
29. See id. at 14; see also Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 12
(statement of Michael F. Scheuer). Scheuer contends that President Clinton's assertion
that the United States insisted receiving countries treat detainees according to U.S. law
was a lie. See id.
30. See Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 12 (statement of Michael
F. Scheuer).
31. See National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, Eighth
Public Hearing: Counterterrorism Policy (March 24, 2004) (testimony of George Tenet, Di-
rector of the Central Intelligence Agency), available at http://govinfo.library.unt.eduI911
archive/hearing8/9-l1Commission Hearing_2004-03-24.pdf.
32. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, Rule Change Lets C.I.A. Freely Send Suspects
Abroad, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 6, 2005, § 1, at 1; see also Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, su-
pra note 23, at 12-13 (statement of Michael F. Scheuer).




the President granted the CIA broad latitude in carrying out the
rendition program, freeing it from case-by-case approval by the
White House, the Justice Department, or the State Department. 34
Most importantly, renditions no longer required the suspected
terrorist to be wanted or convicted in the receiving country
through any legal process. Instead, detention and interrogation
alone were now reason enough to capture a suspected terrorist
and transfer him to a foreign intelligence service.36
To carry out this new directive, the CIA stepped up its rendi-
tion efforts. Generally, the CIA still collaborated with the country
where the suspected terrorist would be abducted. 37 As Michael
Scheuer later put it: "[The CIA] would advise [the country where
the suspect would be transferred,] and if they would have ar-
rested him, we would have assisted in facilitating his move to the
country where he was wanted. '3' For the most part, this post-9/1 1
rendition process followed a consistent pattern. According to most
accounts, authorities in the country where the suspect was ab-
ducted initially arrested the individual.39 Many suspects re-
mained in the arresting authorities' custody for preliminary ques-
tioning-in most cases without access to their consulate, a
lawyer, or anyone else.4° The CIA played the crucial role in trans-
portation: once the arresting country was through with the detai-
nee, the CIA would arrange and facilitate the prisoner's transfer
on an executive jet to a third country.4' Once there, the CIA deli-
vered the suspect to the receiving country's intelligence service4
Victims were blindfolded and drugged by agents dressed head-to-
toe in black before being strapped down to a seat or mattress in-
34. See Jehl & Johnston, supra note 32.
35. Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 12-13 (statement of Michael
F. Scheuer). The Bush Administration's rendition program was "aimed only at those sus-
pected of knowing about terrorist operations." Jehl & Johnston, supra note 32.
36. Jehl & Johnston, supra note 32.
37. See, e.g., Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 28 (testimony of Mi-
chael F. Scheuer) (describing how the United States would facilitate an arrest in France).
38. Id.
39. See generally Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Report, supra note 24, at
24-45 (describing individual accounts of various extraordinary rendition victims).
40. See, e.g., First Amended Complaint paras. 104, 169, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Datap-
lan, Inc., No. 5:07-cv-02798 (JW) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007); Comm. on Legal Affairs and
Human Rights Report, supra note 24 at 25-26.
41. GREY, supra note 27, at 135. For extensive background on the program, primarily
concerning the transportation aspect of the process, see generally id.
42. See id. at 29-30.
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side an otherwise luxurious Gulfstream jet and flown to a desti-
nation unknown to them.43 There are now extensive reports on
the CIA's elaborate network of private jets and contractors that
shuttled these suspects around the globe.44 Often referred to as
the "CIA's travel agent" or "torture taxis," these private contrac-
tors were ready at a moment's notice to transport suspected ter-
rorists at the CIA's direction.45 The flights spanned many conti-
nents; logs indicate that one plane visited the United States, the
United Kingdom, Germany, Jordan, Japan, Italy, Morocco, Pakis-
tan, Sweden, Egypt, and Afghanistan, among many other coun-
tries.46 The final destinations for many of these planes' unwilling
passengers, though, were countries such as Egypt, Morocco, Jor-
dan, and Syria-all of which the U.S. State Department consis-
tently brands as human rights violators.47
After arriving, the CIA promptly handed over the suspects to
the receiving country's intelligence service .4 Each experience dif-
fered from that point, but all of the now-public accounts indicate
grave mistreatment. 49 Accounts of those rendered and later re-
leased paint a disturbing picture of the detainees' treatment:
* being sliced with a scalpel, including on the genitals, and
having hot liquid poured on the incisions; °
* enduring severe beatings while handcuffed and blind-
folded;51
43. See Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Report, supra note 24, at 23-24
(describing the "security check" process).
44. See id. at 16-17. In compiling its report, the Council of Europe reviewed flight
logs, information from non-governmental individuals and organizations, "planespotters,"
Eurocontrol, which is the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation, twenty
national aviation authorities, detainees themselves, transportation authorities, airport
operators, and exhibits from judicial and parliamentary inquiries. See id.
45. See, e.g., TREVOR PAGLEN & A.C. THOMPSON, TORTURE TAXI: ON THE TRAIL OF THE
CIA's RENDITION FLIGHTS (2006); Jane Mayer, Outsourcing: The C.I.A.'s Travel Agent,
NEW YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 34.
46. See GREY, supra note 27, at app. B.
47. See TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 19, at 8.
48. See id. at 12.
49. See, e.g., Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Report, supra note 24, at 25,
35-44.
50. See First Amended Complaint para. 70, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No.
5:07-cv-02798 (JW) (N.D. Cal. Aug. 1, 2007).
51. See id. para. 105.
1142 [Vol. 43:1135
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e being shackled naked to a wet mattress and shocked
through electrodes attached to various body parts, including ear
lobes, nipples, and genitals; 2
* other severe psychological threats, including threats of
death, rape, and electrocution,53 as well as threats to do the same
to family members.54
In addition, detainees were kept in horribly unsanitary condi-
tions, often confined in very small cells that were completely dark
and filled with open sewage. 55 Speakers blared loud music and
tapes of women and children screaming into the prisoners' cells
for days on end. 6 Many detainees would go months without any
outside contact.5 They would endure this treatment until they
were released or convicted.5" The United States acknowledges the
number of these post-9/11 renditions it has conducted is some-
where in the "mid-range two figures."59 It was through this
process that the rendition program, once aimed at returning fugi-
tives to the United States to face trial, earned its new name: ex-
traordinary rendition.6 °
Given these drastic measures, it is not surprising that many
people oppose the program, including domestic politicians,6 for-
eign governments,62 and, perhaps most vocally, domestic and in-
ternational human rights groups. Congressional leaders have
52. See id. para. 145.
53. See id. para. 70.
54. See id. para. 95.
55. See id. paras. 71, 77, 78, 104, 141, 165.
56. See id. paras. 79, 164, 217, 218.
57. See id. paras. 104, 140, 163, 169.
58. See id. paras. 107, 108, 117.
59. See Michael V. Hayden, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Address Be-
fore the Council on Foreign Relations (September 7, 2007), available at http://www.cfr.
org/publication/14162/conversationwith michael-haydenrush transcripLfederal news_
service.html.
60. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND GLOBAL JUSTICE, N.Y. UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, ON THE
RECORD: U.S. DISCLOSURES ON RENDITION, SECRET DETENTION, AND COERCIVE INTERRO-
GATION 1 (2008) [hereinafter ON THE RECORD], available at http://www.chrgj.orgprojects/
docs/ontherecord.pdf.
61. See Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 2 (statement of Rep. Bill
Delahunt).
62. See infra Parts IV.B-C.
63. For instance, the American Civil Liberties Union represented the plaintiffs in both
the El-Masri and Mohamed cases, and maintains an extensive database of documents and
sources regarding extraordinary rendition. See American Civil Liberties Union: Extraordi-
nary Rendition, http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/rendition.html (last visited Feb. 25,
2009] 1143
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held hearings on the subject,64 and foreign governments have
conducted investigations into their own countries' involvement in
the program.6" Human rights groups have worked with extraor-
dinary rendition victims, have vociferously opposed the program,
and are working to bring it to light and eliminate it.66
Many of these opponents argue that the United States is
breaching its domestic and international legal obligations without
any accountability, and that the United States is abducting and
imprisoning people not only in violation of the law, but also in vi-
olation of basic standards of human rights.67 Detainees are grave-
ly mistreated and cut off from any outside communication, includ-
ing, in many cases, the aid of the International Committee of the
Red Cross. They are deprived of the most basic essentials of hu-
manity while held indefinitely without being charged with any
crime." Opponents further point to innocent victims of extraordi-
nary rendition who were later exonerated, as was the case in sev-
eral known instances.69 Because their detention is not reviewable,
most of these victims' innocence is discovered only after months
or even years of detention.7 ° Other opponents point to broader in-
ternational concerns, primarily that the United States alienates
itself from allied governments by conducting illegal renditions in
their countries.71 Moreover, these allies' continued support of the
2009). Other groups, including Reprieve, the Constitution Project, and the New York City
Bar Association, filed amicus curiae briefs in several cases, and various human rights clin-
ics have assisted in representing victims as well. See, e.g., The Constitution Project, Our
Work, http://www.constitutionproject.orglabout/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). In
addition, Amnesty International has been vocal in its criticism of extraordinary renditions.
See Amnesty International USA, Oppose the Outsourcing of Torture, http://www.amnesty
usa.org/war-on-terror/reports-statements-and-issue-briefs/oppose-the-outsourcing-of-tort
ture/page.do?id=1031038 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
64. See, e.g., Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23.
65. See infra Part IV.B.
66. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
67. See David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition: A Human
Rights Analysis, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 123, 123-30 (2006); see also TORTURE BY PROXY,
supra note 19, pt. V.
68. See, e.g., Peter Johnston, Leaving the Invisible Universe: Why All Victims of Ex-
traordinary Rendition Need a Cause of Action Against the United States, 16 J.L. & POL'Y
357, 382-84 (2007).
69. See, e.g., id. at 381-84.
70. See id. at 383-84.
71. See, e.g., Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 6 (statement of Juli-
anne Smith, Director and Senior Fellow, Europe Program, Center for Strategic and Inter-
national Studies) ("I can confirm that the issue of extraordinary rendition ... ha[s] cast a
rather dark shadow on our relationship with our European allies. While transatlantic in-
telligence and law enforcement cooperation does continue, European political leaders are
[Vol. 43:11351144
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United States is crucial to eliminating the threat of worldwide
terrorism." Opponents also argue that the United States loses its
moral high ground and credibility in the international arena by
participating in extraordinary renditions while simultaneously
condemning the same countries to which it has been rendering
suspected terrorists for human rights violations.73 Finally, and on
a more utilitarian note, many characterize extraordinary rendi-
tions, and torture generally, as unnecessary and even counter-
productive, producing little actionable intelligence and too many
false positives.74
Despite objections to the program, many of its architects stand
by its effectiveness in preventing international terrorists from at-
tacking the United States. Several key executive branch leaders
in the Bush Administration insist that the extraordinary rendi-
tion program is successful and is actively protecting the American
public by detaining terrorists before they can strike.7" Michael
Scheuer explained the program's significance in his testimony be-
fore Congress: "[T]he Rendition Program has been the single most
effective counterterrorism operation ever conducted by the United
States Government. Americans are safer today because of the
program."76 He also insisted that the CIA only focused on high-
coming under increasing pressure to distance themselves from the United States[, . . .
[which] could pose a threat to joint intelligence activity with our European allies.").
72. See, e.g., id. at 6-7.
73. See, e.g., id. at 2 (statement of Rep. Bill Delahunt) (extraordinary renditions "have
undermined our very commitment to fundamental American values. These values are
what define us [as] a people, as a nation. When we undermine them, we undermine every-
thing we stand for, everything we are.... Nations across the globe envy our commitment
to freedom and the rule of law. But they are appalled at our hypocrisy when we betray
those values. The State Department recently issued its annual Human Rights Country
Reports criticizing abusive practices carried out overseas. How much credibility can such a
report have when we ourselves are involved in abusive practices?").
74. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 68, at 372-76.
75. See Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 14 (statement of Michael
F. Scheuer); see also Hearing on Intelligence Community Activities, supra note 3, at 599 ("I
know that we are on the right track today and as a result we are safer as a nation. 'No
Limits' aggressive, relentless, worldwide pursuit of any terrorist who threatens us is the
only way to go and is the bottom line. What we have managed to achieve abroad has been
due in large part to the extraordinary professionalism of our men and women in [the CIA's
Counterterrorism Center] and those CIA operatives overseas who do the risky, hard work
of counterterrorism. Lastly, I was proud of them then, am now, and will be until I die.")
(testimony of Cofer Black, Director of the Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence
Agency); GREY, supra note 27, at 228 (recalling former Secretary of State Condoleezza
Rice's defense of rendition as "a vital tool in combating transnational terrorism").
76. Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 14 (statement of Michael F.
Scheuer).
2009] 1145
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
level Al-Qaeda leaders whose capture would best interrupt terror-
ist activities.77 Scheuer did not apologize for his involvement, but
rather maintained that those who revealed the program publicly
were endangering CIA officers who put their lives at risk to pro-
tect the public.7"
III. APPLICABLE INTERNATIONAL LAW
Regardless of one's stance on the policy of extraordinary rendi-
tion, there can be no debate that the program has significant le-
gal implications. Several substantive principles of international
law regarding torture encompass the extraordinary rendition
program. There are two broad categories from which these rules
are derived: customary international law and treaties. Both
sources have profound implications on the extraordinary rendi-
tion program.
A. Customary International Norm Against Torture and
Principles of Jus Cogens
International law has long relied on custom to form its basis.
Such law is created in the way its name implies: "from a general
and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of
legal obligation."79 While these norms must be sufficiently wide-
spread, they can nevertheless attain the status of customary law
even if they are not universally followed."0 Once a level of general
acceptance is reached, the norm becomes binding on all states un-
less a state declares its dissent from that norm while the norm is
developing into a widespread, customary practice.8 ' Thus, these
customs become binding law through states' practices and their
developing senses of obligation created over time throughout the
world. 2
77. Id. at 13.
78. Id.
79. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(2) (1987).
80. See id. § 102 cmt. b ("A practice can be general even if it is not universally fol-
lowed; there is no precise formula to indicate how widespread a practice must be, but it
should reflect wide acceptance among the states particularly involved in the relevant ac-
tivity.").
81. See id. ("A principle of customary law is not binding on a state that declares its
dissent from the principle during its development.").
82. See id. § 102 cmt. d ("[Customary law may be built by the acquiescence as well as
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Closely related to the creation of customary international law
is the concept of jus cogens. "The theory of jus cogens ... posits
the existence of rules of international law that admit of no dero-
gation and that can be amended only by a new general norm of
international law of the same value."83 They "are said to be so
fundamental that they bind all states, and no nation may dero-
gate from or agree to contravene them."84 Instead of being derived
merely from custom and practice, though, jus cogens norms are
considered to be overarching principles that are so basic to hu-
manity that they cannot be breached, even if a state dissents and
argues that it is not so bound. 5 While there is debate over which
substantive rights qualify for this status, it is a limited field not
easily entered.86
Few contest that customary international norms prohibit offi-
cial torture; many authoritative sources further hold that official
torture has reachedjus cogens status. An American case provides
a helpful guide in applying these principles. In Siderman de
Blake v. Republic of Argentina, the Ninth Circuit discussed the
distinctions and applications in depth.87 It began by noting the
by the actions of States and become generally binding on all states .... ") (internal refer-
ence omitted).
83. Dinah Shelton, Normative Hierarchy in International Law, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
291, 297 (2006).
84. BARRY E. CARTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAw 120 (5th ed. 2007).
85. Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, 965 F. 2d 699, 714, 715 (9th Cir. 1992).
86. Professor Shelton writes:
Since the adoption of the Vienna Convention, the literature has abounded in
claims that additional international norms constitute jus cogens. Proponents
have argued for the inclusion of all human rights, all humanitarian norms
(human rights and the laws of war), or singly, the duty not to cause trans-
boundary environmental harm, freedom from torture, the duty to assassinate
dictators, the right to life of animals, self-determination, the right to devel-
opment, free trade, and territorial sovereignty (despite legions of treaties
transferring territory from one state to another). During the Cold War, Soviet
writers asserted the invalidity of treaties that conflicted with the 'basic prin-
ciples and concepts" of international law, defined to include universal peace
and security of nations; respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; non-
interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit between nations;
and pacta sunt servanda. Examples of invalid agreements included the NATO
pact, the peace treaty between the United States and Japan, the SEATO
agreement, and the U.S.-UK agreement on establishing air bases. In most in-
stances, little evidence has been presented to demonstrate how and why the
preferred norm has become jus cogens. Wladysitaw Czaplinski correctly
comments that "the trend to abuse the notion ofjus cogens is always present
among international lawyers."
Shelton, supra note 83, at 303-04 (internal citations omitted).
87. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 714-15. The Sidermans lived in Argentina during
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difference between the two sources: customary law relies on the
consent of those bound, while jus cogens norms may not be dero-
gated regardless of whether the state assents to them."8 The court
looked to the same sources as one would to derive customary law:
the general usage and practice of nations, judicial decisions, and
the works of jurists.8 9 But it also looked to whether those norms
were considered among nations to be non-derogable, thus rising
to the status of jus cogens norms.9 ° Easily reaching the primary
level, the court held that "[tihere is no doubt that the prohibition
against official torture is a norm of customary international
law."9 In support of this proposition, the court cited various
American cases,92 treaties evidencing a well-accepted customary
norm,93 and the Restatement of Foreign Relations, 94 all of which
the 1976 military coup, when various family members were kidnapped and tortured at the
direction of the new ruling military governor. Id. at 703. A full account is given in the Si-
derman de Blake opinion, including the family's flight to America and Argentina's contin-
ued harassment of the family. Id. at 703-04.
88. Id. at 715 ("While jus cogens and customary international law are related, they
differ in one important respect. Customary international law ... rests on the consent of
states. A state that persistently objects to a norm of customary international law that oth-
er states accept is not bound by that norm .... In contrast, jus cogens 'embraces customa-
ry laws considered binding on all nations' and is 'derived from values taken to be funda-
mental by the international community, rather than from the fortuitous or self-interested
choices of nations.' Whereas customary international law derives solely from the consent
of states, the fundamental and universal norms constituting jus cogens transcend such
consent. . . ." (internal citations omitted)).
89. Id. at 714-15 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)); United
States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-61 (1820).
90. Id. at 715 (citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929,
940 (D.C. Cir. 1988)). The Siderman de Blake court relied heavily for its framework on
Committee of U.S. Citizens, which, at the time, was the "only reported federal decision to
give extended treatment tojus cogens." Id. at 715.
91. Id. at 716.
92. Id. (citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 884 (2d Cir. 1980) ("[Olfficial torture is now prohi-
bited by the law of nations."); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1541 (N.D. Cal.
1987) ("official torture constitutes a cognizable violation of the law of nations")). Since Si-
derman de Blake, several other courts have held that torture is a violation of customary
international law. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadli, 70 F.3d 232, 243-44 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Es-
tate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 499 (9th Cir. 1992).
93. Siderman de Blake, 965 F.2d at 716 & n.15 (citing Organization of American
States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123; European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 3, Nov. 4, 1950, Europ. T.S. No. 5; Declaration on the Protection of All Per-
sons from Being Subjected to Torture, G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), at 91, U.N. GAOR, 30th
Sess., 2433rd plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/10034 (Dec. 9, 1975), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS 68-70 (Ian Brownlie & Guy S. Goodwin-Gill eds., 5th ed. 2006) [herei-
nafter Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture]; In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI)a, at 49,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res.
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concluded that torture "is prohibited by customary international
law."95 The court did not stop there: "[W]hile not all customary in-
ternational law carries with it the force of a jus cogens norm, the
prohibition against official torture has attained that status."96 In
declaring the right to be free from torture a jus cogens norm, the
court again noted American jurisprudence97 and widespread
agreement among international law scholars accepting it as
such.9" The "extraordinary consensus" among these sources was
especially important: it confirmed to the Siderman de Blake court
that torture is not only prohibited by customary international
law, but it has reached the status of one of the few recognizedjus
cogens norms.9 9 By so finding, the court held that "the right to be
free from official torture is fundamental and universal, a right
deserving of the highest status under international law, a norm of
jus cogens."00 Other authorities similarly have recognized that
freedom from torture is ajus cogens norm.1"'
Many international instruments support the proposition that
the right to be free from torture is a customary, non-derogable
principle. The Convention Against Torture ("CAT"), which is dis-
cussed infra as the primary international instrument outlawing
official torture,0 2 expressly forbids torture and does not allow for
any derogation for any reason.0 3 The CAT's preamble recognizes
217A(III), at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 177th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 8, 1948)).
94. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW, § 702(d) (1987)).
95. Id. at 716.
96. Id. at 717.
97. Id. (citing Comm. of U.S. Citizens Living in Nicar. v. Reagan, 859 F.2d 929, 941
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (holding that torture is a jus cogens norm); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630
F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980) (describing freedom from torture as "[almong the rights un-
iversally proclaimed by all nations"); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §
702 cmt. n. (1987)).
98. Id. (citing David F. Klein, A Theory for the Application of the Customary Interna-
tional Law of Human Rights by Domestic Courts, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 332, 354 n.111 (1988);
Karen Parker & Lyn Beth Neylon, Jus Cogens: Compelling the Law of Human Rights, 12
HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 411, 437-39 (1989); Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Ju-
risdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785, 830 (1988); Adam C. Belsky et
al., Implied Waiver Under the FSIA: A Proposed Exception to Immunity for Violations of
Peremptory Norms of International Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 365, 389, 393-94 (1989)).
99. See id. at 717.
100. Id.
101. See TORTURE BY PROXY, supra note 19, at 34-35 n.184 (citing various sources).
102. See infra Part III.B.
103. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, art. 2, para 2, adopted Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY Doc. No. 100-20 (1988),
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Convention Against Torture]; see also TORTURE BY PROXY,
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several other indications that freedom from torture is of para-
mount importance, including Article 5 of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights and Article 7 of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights, "both of which provide that no one
shall be subjected to torture."1 °4 It also cites the Declaration on
the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture
adopted by the United Nations' General Assembly. 105 One Ameri-
can case went further, citing the American Convention on Human
Rights and the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as evidence of a customary
international norm against torture.
10 6
While these international instruments do not create privately
enforceable causes of action for their violation, they nevertheless
have a "substantial indirect effect on international law" and may
be used to show that the principles espoused therein have at-
tained the status of customary international law.10 7 Even though
such declarations and treaties may not create separately enforce-
able legal rights, each is a "good example of an informal prescrip-
tion given legal significance by the actions of authoritative deci-
sion-makers"10  and is "increasingly used ... for codifying and
developing customary law."10 9
In this light, it is clear that freedom from official torture has
attained the force of customary international law and, arguably,
the coveted status of ajus cogens norm.
B. The Convention Against Torture
Beyond customary law and jus cogens norms, the CAT is the
primary international legal instrument specifically outlawing tor-
supra note 19, at 80-81 (stating that the absolute prohibition against torture was "specifi-
cally included in CAT to distinguish freedom from torture as one of 'the few fundamental
rights of the individual' from which no derogation is permitted under international law,
even in times of war or other emergency").
104. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, pmbl.
105. See id. (citing Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to
Torture, supra note 93).
106. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 883-84 (2d Cir. 1980).
107. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 & n.23 (2004).
108. Id. (quoting IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 535 (6th
ed. 2003)).
109. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102 cmt. F (1987).
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ture." The CAT includes provisions requiring each signatory to
take steps to prevent acts of torture in territory under its jurisdic-
tion,"' to ensure that torture is a crime under its domestic law,"1
2
and to provide an effective and individual legal remedy where
torture does occur." 3 The CAT also regulates cruel, inhuman, or
degrading treatment occurring in the territories under each sig-
natory's jurisdiction." 4 With such a broad reach, the CAT's prohi-
bition of torture not only implicates domestic criminal law, but
also immigration extradition proceedings and prison conditions."'
The CAT also contains a provision that implicates extraordi-
nary renditions. Article 3 requires that "[n]o State Party shall ex-
pel, return ('refouler'), or extradite a person to another State
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he would
be in danger of being subjected to torture.""6 In ratifying the
CAT, however, the United States legitimately restricted Article
3's applicability to situations in which torture is "more likely than
not," in contrast to the "substantial grounds" standard in Article
3 itself."7 This definition gives the United States more leeway to
send individuals to foreign countries compared to the CAT's de-
fault scheme."' Further, the United States noted that it under-
110. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 103. The United States has also
enacted domestic criminal legislation against torture occurring outside the United States,
but, for obvious political reasons, federal prosecutors have not brought any criminal
charges against any U.S. officials or agents for their participation in the CIA's extraordi-
nary rendition program. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A (2006); see also Scott Horton, Jus-
tice After Bush: Prosecuting an Outlaw Administration, HARPER'S, Dec. 2008, at 49, 55
(stating that the Bush Administration's tight rein on its prosecutors has deferred such in-
dividuals from enforcing 18 U.S.C. § 2340's prohibition against torture, despite the fact
that they have the authority to do so).
111. See Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, art. 2, para. 1.
112. See id. art. 4, para. 1.
113. See id. art. 14, para. 1.
114. See id. art. 16, para. 1. The United States adopted this provision with the under-
standing that cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment is defined under the fifth, eighth,
and fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. See 136 CONG. REC. 36, 192 (1990).
115. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, UNITED STATES WRITTEN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS
ASKED BY THE COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE: LIST OF ISSUES TO BE CONSIDERED DURING
THE EXAMINATION OF THE SECOND PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
art. 1, para. 6 (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/
68662.pdf [hereinafter RESPONSE TO COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE].
116. Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, art. 3, para. 1.
117. See 136 CONG. REC. 36, 193 (1990). For a helpful background discussion on these
reservations, see David Weissbrodt & Amy Bergquist, Extraordinary Rendition and the
Torture Convention, 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 600-05 (2006).
118. See A. John Radsan, A More Regular Process for Irregular Rendition, 37 SETON
HALL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2006).
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stands torture in this context to be "an act... specifically in-
tended to inflict severe physical or mental pain or suffering and
that mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm"
caused by a limited number of specific actions.119
Article 3 forms the basis of many attacks on the CIA's extraor-
dinary rendition program, which seems to carry out precisely
what the CAT prohibits. Although Article 3's language is fairly
straightforward, the United States has advanced several legal de-
fenses against claims that it has breached that provision of the
CAT.12 It first argues that Article 3 only applies to expelling or
extraditing an individual from the United States; in other words,
rendering someone from a foreign country to a different foreign
country does not invoke Article 3's protections at all.121 Scholars,
as well as the Committee Against Torture,'22 question this legal
argument and reply that it is untenable.'23 Further, the United
States argues that it may seek diplomatic assurances from the re-
ceiving countries that individuals turned over will not be tor-
tured.'24 This is a similarly shaky legal position, as Article 3 re-
quires an assessment of "all relevant considerations" of the
receiving country, including any "consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant or mass violations of human rights," when determining
whether an rendered individual is likely to endure torture upon
his return.'25 The U.S. State Department has classified most of
the countries to which extraordinary rendition victims are sent as
human rights violators and has documented gross human rights
violations by these countries in its annual country reports.'26 In
119. See 136 CONG. REC. 36, 193 (1990).
120. In addition to these legal arguments, the United States also flatly denies that it
sends detainees to countries for the purpose of torture. See RESPONSE TO COMMIITEE
AGAINST TORTURE supra note 115, art. 3, para. 16.
121. See id. art. 3, para. 13 ("[Tlhe United States, while recognizing that some mem-
bers of the Committee may disagree, believes that Article 3 of the CAT does not impose
obligations on the United States with respect to an individual who is outside the territory
of the United States.").
122. See infra Part IV.A.
123. See, e.g., Margaret L. Satterthwaite, Rendered Meaningless: Extraordinary Rendi-
tion and the Rule of Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1333, 1367-71, 1375-80 (2007) (arguing
that the United States erroneously applies the territorial rule of jurisdiction rather than
the personal control doctrine to interpret Article 3 of the CAT).
124. See RESPONSE TO COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 115, art. 3, para. 18.
125. Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, art. 3, para. 2.
126. See, e.g., BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: EGYPT (2008), available at http:l
www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2007/100594.htm ("There were numerous, credible reports
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more frank terms, Michael Scheuer relayed to Congress that
these assurances were not "worth a bucket of warm spit."
1 27
Accordingly, many nations other than the United States agree
that the CAT condemns and outlaws renditions involving the
transfer of an individual from one foreign country to another to be
tortured. 12' Even taking into account the United States' reserva-
tion requiring a determination that the suspect will "more likely
than not be tortured," many sources have questioned the United
States' reliance on shaky diplomatic assurances from countries
that are often flagged as human rights violators.'29
As noted supra, the torture to which extraordinary rendition
victims are subjected not only violates substantive customary in-
ternational law-and arguably ajus cogens norm-against official
torture, but also implicates Article 3 of the CAT, prohibiting the
rendition of a suspect to another country to be tortured.
IV. LACK OF INTERNATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL ENFORCEMENT
At the international and institutional level, despite numerous
inquiries, investigations, and political consequences, the United
States has not been held directly accountable for its practices.
that security forces tortured and mistreated prisoners and detainees."); BUREAU OF
DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, 2007 COUNTRY REPORTS ON
HuMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES: SYRIA (2008), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2007/100606.htm (characterizing the torture and abuse of detainees as common, in-
cluding electrical shocks, pulling out fingernails, forcing objects into subject's rectum, and
hanging from the ceiling while beating).
127. Extraordinary Rendition Hearing, supra note 23, at 36 (testimony of Michael F.
Scheuer); see also GREY, supra note 27, at 223 ("'I can't say to you with any candor that
there was anything more than the verbal assurance, or even a written assurance. There
was very little effort to follow up on [the detainees' treatment].'") (quoting interview with
Edward S. Walker, former U.S. ambassador to Cairo (March 13, 2006)); id. ("'No one was
kidding anyone here[; w]e knew exactly what that kind of promise was worth.'") (quoting
interview with Michael Scheuer, former Chief of Bin Laden Unit, Central Intelligence
Agency (March 14, 2006)); id. ("'I cannot believe that anybody that was involved in this
didn't in his heart of hearts, if he was halfway intelligent, think that [the detainees] were
getting abusive, aggressive interrogation techniques that were tantamount to torture, or
that they would be tried in a fair and U.S.-style trial."') (quoting interview with Edward S.
Walker, supra).
128. For example, the European Parliament, by a vote of 334 to 237, condemned the
use of renditions and noted, in particular, the practice's violation of the CAT. See Press
Release, European Parliament, Extraordinary Renditions: EU Member States are also Re-
sponsible, MEPs Say (Feb 19, 2009), available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections
2009/welcome/press service.htm?language=EN&ref=20090218IPR49768&secondRef=0
(last visited Feb. 25, 2009).
129. See RESPONSE TO COMMIT E AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 115, art. 3, para. 16.
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A. The Committee Against Torture
The CAT provides an internal enforcement mechanism to mon-
itor and enforce violations. Part II of the CAT establishes the
Committee Against Torture, known as the Committee, to receive
each State Party's required reports and to hear and decide dis-
putes between State Parties or between an individual and her
State. 130
The Committee has taken some steps to ensure that the United
States is properly adhering to the CAT, but those measures have
been largely recommendatory, have carried little real weight, and
have failed to hold the United States accountable for its breaches.
In its Consideration of Reports Submitted by the United States,
the Committee pointedly addressed extraordinary rendition. 31 It
concluded and recommended that, among other things, the Unit-
ed States should "apply the non-refoulement guarantee to all de-
tainees in its custody, [and] cease the rendition of suspects, in
particular by its intelligence agencies, to States where they face a
real risk of torture, in order to comply with its obligations under
article 3 of the Convention." 132 The Committee was particularly
"concerned that the [United States] considers that the non-
refoulement obligation.., does not extend to a person detained
outside its territory.' 33 The Committee further took issue with
the United States' reliance on diplomatic assurances, concluding
that the United States "should only rely on 'diplomatic assur-
130. Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, art. 17, para. 1, art. 19, para. 1, art.
21, para. 1.
131. U.N. Comm. Against Torture [CAT], Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 19 of the Convention: Conclusions and Recommendations of the
Committee against Torture, United States of America, paras. 15-20, U.N. Doc.
CAT/C/USA/CO/2 (May 19, 2006) [hereinafter Consideration of Reports Submitted] (consi-
dering the second report of the United States).
132. Id. para. 20. The Committee also implicated the United States' practice of ex-
traordinary rendition in its Agiza v. Sweden decision, which dealt with the extraordinary
rendition of Ahmed Agiza from Sweden to Egypt, with the help of the American CIA.
Comm. Against Torture [CAT], Communication No. 233/2003, U.N. Doc. CAT/C/34/D/233/
2003 (May 21, 2005), available at http://www.unhcr.orgrefworld/docid/42ce734a2.html.
The Committee Against Torture found that Sweden breached Article 3 of the CAT by al-
lowing Agiza to be sent back to Egypt to face that country's "consistent and widespread
use of torture against detainees ... particularly. . . in the case of detainees held for politi-
cal and security reasons." Id. para. 13.4.




ances' in regard to States which do not systematically violate the
Convention's provisions."134
Beyond that, no other country has taken significant measures
to hold the United States accountable under the Committee's dis-
pute resolution powers. Article 21 of the CAT gives the Commit-
tee the power to hear disputes arising between parties to the
CAT.13 Under this power, the country of which an extraordinary
rendition victim is a citizen can file a complaint with the Commit-
tee alleging that the United States is not fulfilling its obligations
under the CAT.1 36 The Committee then has the power to investi-
gate the alleged violation and present a report of its findings, in-
cluding facts and a proposed solution if the countries cannot
agree on one. 137 To date, no country has initiated with the Com-
mittee any such proceeding against the United States.
13
Although the Committee has taken broad action and seems ge-
nuinely interested in remedying the United States' violations, its
pronouncements still fail to hold the United States accountable in
any tangible way beyond imposing political consequences.
B. International Investigations
Besides the Committee, several other foreign governmental
and intergovernmental organizations have conducted investiga-
tions. The Council of Europe has been the primary intergovern-
mental body involved in investigating and documenting extraor-
dinary renditions.13 9 The European Parliament has also weighed
in. 4 ' Individual countries adding to this list include Italy, 4' and
the United Kingdom. 42 Many of their reports and investigations
reached the same result-extraordinary renditions had been tak-
ing place. In response, they too issued conclusions denouncing the
134. See id. para. 21.
135. Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, art. 21.
136. See id. art. 21, para. 1.
137. Id.
138. The United States also has not implemented Article 22 of the CAT, which allows
an individual to file a claim against her own government. See id. art. 22.
139. See generally Comm. on Legal Affairs and Human Rights Report, supra note 24.
140. See Report on the Alleged Use of European Countries by the CIA for the Transpor-
tation and Illegal Detention of Prisoners, EUR. PARL. Doc. A6-0020/2007 (2007).
141. See infra Part IV.C.
142. See INTELLIGENCE & SECURITY COMMITTEE, RENDITION, 2007, Cm. 7171, at 5,
available at http:llwww.fas.org/irp/world/uk/rendition.pdf"
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program and their home countries' involvement in it, but still
failed to hold the United States accountable for its violations of
international law. 
143
C. Italy's "Imam Rapito Affair"
Italian prosecutors made one notable attempt to hold directly
responsible American officials participating in the extraordinary
rendition of Abu Omar, an Egyptian national granted political
asylum in Italy. Omar was rendered from Italy to Egypt, where
he claims he was tortured before being released."M When his ren-
dition's existence unfolded, it created a firestorm in Italy, and
prosecutors indicted more than twenty CIA officers whom they
claimed took part in the rendition.14 A judge issued arrest war-
rants, and the prosecutors sent a request to the Italian Justice
Ministry seeking extradition of the indicted CIA officers from the
United States to Italy for trial.'46 The Justice Ministry, however,
denied this request; the United States has since stated that it
would not have extradited the CIA officers even if presented with
a request to do so from the Italian Ministry. 47
These various international measures have elucidated the in-
ner workings of the CIA's extraordinary rendition program, but
still have failed to hold those responsible accountable in any
meaningful way beyond issuing recommendations, condemna-
tions, and unenforceable arrest warrants.
V. COURTS OF LAST RESORT: FRUSTRATION OF AMERICAN CLAIMS
As a result of the lack of international and institutional en-
forcement discussed in Part IV, several extraordinary rendition
143. See, e.g., id. at 29-30.
144. See GREY, supra note 27, at 191, 197-98.
145. See id. at 211-12.
146. See id.
147. See id.; Craig Whitlock, U.S. Won't Send CIA Defendants to Italy, WASH. POST,
Mar. 1, 2007, at A12. Germany tried something similar and issued arrest warrants for the
CIA officers responsible for Khaled El-Masri's kidnapping, but the case has not gained any
traction. See id.; see also Craig Whitlock, Germans Charge 13 CIA Operatives, WASH.
POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at Al. And although the Italian trial eventually started without the
CIA defendants present, it was drawn out for some time as questions arose over the Ital-
ian police's surveillance tactics. See Elisabetta Povoledo, Kidnapping Trial of Operatives
from the C.I.A. Delayed in Italy, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2007, at A6.
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victims have turned to a seeming last resort: seeking relief in
U.S. federal courts. Several claims and causes of action exist that
theoretically would allow the victim to pursue these lawsuits in
domestic court, including, most notably, the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"). 148 Although this cause of action covers the substantive
issues at play when litigating extraordinary rendition suits, none
of the suits brought thus far has been successful in holding the
United States accountable for its program because each has been
dismissed before its merits have been analyzed. This part will de-
scribe the framework under which these claims arise before do-
cumenting the specific problems that several domestic suits have
faced. It will also discuss further issues that would impair the
successful prosecution of these suits, which highlight the larger
issue looming in the background: the cases are impossible to win.
A. The Alien Tort Statute
The ATS is a federal jurisdictional statute that establishes a
backdrop against which foreign plaintiffs can prove violations of
international law in U.S. courts. 49 In short, the ATS only pro-
vides aliens access to the courts. Once there, the plaintiffs must
prove a violation of international law through either the "law of
nations" or a treaty to which the United States is a party.15 °
The First Congress passed the ATS as part of the Judiciary Act
of 1789.151 It led a quiet existence until relatively recently, when
it was dusted off and first used as a tool to enforce international
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The closely related Torture Victims Protection Act
("TVPA") applies only to foreign governments. See id. Although plaintiffs have tried to use
the TVPA as a remedy for extraordinary rendition, those efforts have not succeeded; nei-
ther have Bivens claims. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 414 F. Supp. 2d 250, 267, 287 (E.D.N.Y.
2006) ("Bivens establishes 'that the victims of a constitutional violation by a federal agent
have a right to recover damages against the official in federal court despite the absence of
any statute conferring such a right.'") (quoting Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 18 (1980)).
Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") suits also have debilitating limitations in this context,
primarily that any actions occurring outside the United States are exempt under the
FTCA's foreign country exception. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 711-12
(2004) (rejecting the "headquarters exception" and holding that the FTCA does not waive
sovereign immunity based on an injury suffered in a foreign country, regardless of where
the tortious act or omission occurred). As the ATS is the most viable existing candidate for
enforcing violations in the United States against the United States, it will be the primary
focus of this part.
149. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
150. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724-25, 732-34.
151. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77.
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human rights violations." 2 The ATS provides: "The district courts
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty
of the United States."53 Although the intricacies of substantive
liability for violations of international law under the ATS are still
being debated, as will be discussed infra, there is no question that
the ATS provides nothing more than a jurisdictional grant. If
there was any doubt about this premise, the Supreme Court soli-
dified it in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain in 2004:
As enacted in 1789, the ATS gave the district courts "cognizance" of
certain causes of action, and the term bespoke a grant of jurisdiction,
not power to mold substantive law. The fact that the ATS was placed
in § 9 of the Judiciary Act, a statute otherwise exclusively concerned
with federal-court jurisdiction, is itself support for its strictly juris-
dictional nature.... In sum, we think the statute was intended as
jurisdictional in the sense of addressing the power of the courts to
entertain cases concerned with a certain subject. 154
The ATS's strictly jurisdictional limitation raised another impor-
tant question in Sosa: what qualifies as a violation of interna-
tional law under the ATS? Under the statute, there are two pos-
sibilities.
The first, which Sosa addressed, is a violation of the "law of na-
tions";55 in other words, a violation of customary international
law. Precedent under the ATS provided a wide range of potential
liability, but the Supreme Court in Sosa drastically limited the
violations of customary international law actionable under the
ATS. "'6 The Court began with the premise that the Framers de-
signed the ATS to give rise to a very limited number of actionable
violations with definite content and acceptance among nations as
152. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712 ("[Flor over 170 years after its enactment, [the ATS]
provided jurisdiction in only one case."). More recently, and likely marking the end of the
170-plus-year dearth of case law, the District of Maryland upheld ATS jurisdiction in Adra
v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 859, 865, 866 (D. Md. 1961). The oft-cited case of Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980), marked the beginning of the ATS's frequent invo-
cation, primarily as a tool for prosecuting human rights abuses taking place in foreign
countries.
153. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). The ATS originally read that district courts -'shall also
have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or the circuit courts, as
the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States.'" See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712-13 (quoting Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 77).
154. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713-14 (internal citations omitted).
155. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
156. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732.
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violations of customary international law. These actionable viola-
tions included primarily three offenses: violations of safe conduct,
infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.'57 The
Court also recognized that nothing prevented it from expanding
the realm of actionable violations, and that the "First Con-
gress... assumed that federal courts could properly identify
some international norms as enforceable in the exercise of [ATS]
jurisdiction."'58 Combining these two principles, the Court held
that "federal courts should not recognize private claims under
federal common law for violations of any international law norm
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations
than the historical paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was
enacted."'59 Thus, new causes of action may only arise when the
norm violated reaches the level held by piracy and the infringe-
ment of the rights of ambassadors in the eighteenth century when
Congress passed the ATS.
Torture is undoubtedly one of these violations. As discussed
above, freedom from torture has risen not only to customary in-
ternational law status, but arguably has been added to the short
list of universally applicable jus cogens norms. 6 ° Further, the Su-
preme Court has implicitly approved a cause of action for torture
under the ATS,' 6 ' while Congress has done the same. 162 Accor-
dingly, an alien can bring a valid cause of action under the ATS
for any torture she has suffered in violation of customary interna-
tional law prohibiting the same.
In addition, the vast majority of federal courts facing the issue
have acknowledged that the ATS covers direct as well as complic-
ity or accomplice liability, which is crucial in many extraordinary
rendition cases seeking to hold the United States accountable
157. Id. at 720.
158. Id. at 730.
159. Id. at 732.
160. See supra Part III.A.
161. The Sosa Court recognized Filartiga as a proper invocation of its holding. Sosa,
542, U.S. at 732 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)). Filartiga,
also dealing with torture, noted that "the torturer has become-like the pirate and slave
trader before him-hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind." Filartiga, 630 F.2d
at 890.
162. In enacting the closely-related TVPA, Congress noted that the ATS should remain
intact because "claims based on torture ... do not exhaust the list of actions that may ap-
propriately be covered by section 1350." S. REP. No. 102-249, at 5 (1991).
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where it only transported suspects. 16 3 To prevail in the complicity
context, plaintiffs must show that the United States knowingly
provided practical assistance to the receiving country's acts of tor-
ture by delivering the plaintiffs to the receiving country's intelli-
gence services. 16' Complicity liability is premised only on the
knowledge that the transportation of suspects assisted in the
commission of torture; the United States need not share the tor-
turer's wrongful intent.165 Simply stated, if the United States de-
livered a suspect to a third country knowing that country would
torture him, the United States is liable under this complicity lia-
bility theory. Similarly, a victim theoretically can bring a claim
under the ATS's second provision, which grants jurisdiction over
breaches of treaties to which the United States is a party, includ-
ing the CAT.
B. Problems Arising in ATS Claims
While extraordinary rendition victims have viable substantive
causes of action under the ATS, actually litigating these claims is
the difficult part. Through a variety of legal maneuvers, the Unit-
ed States and its agents have largely insulated themselves from
accountability for the extraordinary rendition program. Several
legal principles have foreclosed suits that have been filed, most
notably the state secrets doctrine and the political questions doc-
trine, while other principles, including the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, would quickly shut out any claims surviving the pre-
vious two.
1. Sovereign Immunity Prevents a Claim Against the United
States
In suing the United States for damages under the ATS for its
extraordinary rendition practices, a plaintiff would first need to
show that the United States has waived its sovereign immunity
for that cause of action. Federal courts generally may not enter-
tain an action against the federal government without its con-
163. See, e.g., Cabello v. Fernindez-Larios, 402 F.3d 1148, 1157-58 (11th Cir. 2005);
Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., No. C99-02506SL, 2006 WL 2455752, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 22,
2006); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 321-
24 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).




sent.166 Further, overcoming sovereign immunity is a difficult
task: any waiver of the federal government's sovereign immunity
must be unequivocal and must be "construed strictly in favor of
the sovereign."' 6 ' More specific to the present context, at least one
court has held that the ATS does not waive sovereign immunity
in suits against the U.S. government, recognizing that nothing in
the ATS's language waives the federal government's immunity.16
This principle poses an initial sticking point for any victim
suing in a federal court seeking relief against the United States
or its agents. Because the ATS does not waive the federal gov-
ernment's sovereign immunity, the United States can seek dis-
missal based solely on this principle.
2. The CAT Is Not Self-Executing
As noted above, the ATS grants aliens jurisdiction in federal
district courts for violations of "treat[ies] of the United States" in
addition to violations of the "law of nations."169 Further, the CAT
prohibits the United States from expelling or returning an indi-
vidual to a country that the United States suspects is more likely
than not going to torture that individual. 7 ° The CAT, however, is
not a self-executing treaty and is not directly enforceable in U.S.
courts.171
Sosa squarely addressed this issue. There, the plaintiff sued
under the ATS claiming a violation of a rule pronounced in sever-
al treaties, but the Court was forced to look elsewhere for rele-
vant guidance:
[A]ithough the [treaty] does bind the United States as a matter of in-
ternational law, the United States ratified the [treaty] on the ex-
press understanding that it was not self-executing and so did not it-
self create obligations enforceable in the federal courts. Accordingly,
166. See United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980) (quoting United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
167. See U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607, 615 (1992) (quoting McMahon v.
United States, 342 U.S. 25, 27 (1951)).
168. See Canadian Trans. Co. v. United States, 663 F.2d 1081, 1092 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
169. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
170. Convention Against Torture, supra note 103, art. 3, para. 1.
171. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 734-35 (2004).
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[plaintiff] cannot say that the [instruments] themselves establish the
relevant and applicable rule of international law.
1 72
Likewise, the United States ratified the CAT with the express
understanding that the treaty was not a self-executing instru-
ment.173 Any private claim under the ATS for a violation of the
CAT cannot rely on the rules laid down in the CAT itself, effec-
tively foreclosing the second branch of actionable ATS claims-
those for violations of "treat[ies] of the United States."'74 There-
fore, while the substantive provisions of the CAT forbid extraor-
dinary rendition, individual victims are left without an effective
private remedy due to the non-self-executing nature of the CAT
itself.
3. The State Secrets Doctrine
There has long existed an evidentiary rule that "secrets of
state" are inadmissible in a court of law.'75 The Supreme Court
took this rule a step further in Totten v. United States.'76 In ex-
tending the "secrets of state" evidentiary privilege to its logical
extreme, the Totten Court held that "public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which
would inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law
itself regards as confidential, and respecting which it will not al-
low the confidence to be violated."17  Thus, instead of excluding
privileged material, the Court expanded the "secrets of state" pri-
vilege to mandate dismissal of the entire action where confiden-
tial government matters would need to be disclosed were it to
proceed. 17' Later, in United States v. Reynolds, the Court, discuss-
ing a long line of state secrets cases, recognized that the United
States may prevent the disclosure of evidence if "there is a rea-
sonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose mili-
172. Id. at 735 (internal citation omitted).
173. See RESPONSE TO COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 115, art. 2, para. 5
(discussing the United States' ratification and purpose behind non-self-executing nature).
174. See 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006).
175. See generally Robert M. Chesney, State Secrets and the Limits of National Security
Litigation, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 1270-77 (2007) (tracing the origins of the state
secrets doctrine from its common law conception through its solidification in American ju-
risprudence).
176. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).




tary matters which, in the interest of national security, should
not be divulged."'79 Reynolds laid the groundwork for the modem
application of the state secrets doctrine, which has seen frequent
use since.80
Relying on the state secrets doctrine, two courts have recently
dismissed claims challenging the extraordinary rendition pro-
gram.' The plaintiff-victims sued various U.S. officials, CIA of-
ficers, and private corporations under the ATS for violations of
the law of nations.'82 Both courts, though, quickly dismissed these
claims when the United States formally intervened and asserted
the state secrets privilege.
The El-Masri court explained its decision:
It is enough to note here that the substance of [plaintiffs] publicly
available complaint alleges a clandestine intelligence program, and
the means and methods the foreign intelligence services of this and
other countries used to carry out the program. And, as the [CIA's]
public declaration makes pellucidly clear, any admission or denial of
these allegations by defendants in this case would reveal the means
and methods employed pursuant to this clandestine program and
such a revelation would present a grave risk of injury to national se-
curity.
18 3
The Mohamed court provided that "inasmuch as the case in-
volves 'allegations' about the conduct by the CIA, the privilege is
invoked to protect information which is properly the subject of
179. 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953).
180. See Chesney, supra note 174, at 1289-1307 (discussing the state secrets doctrine
in the post-Reynolds era).
181. The first was El-Masri v. Tenet, 437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 541 (E.D. Va. 2006). Khaled
El-Masri, a German citizen of Lebanese descent, was abducted in Macedonia and claimed
he was rendered to Afghanistan and tortured at a CIA "black site" there, known as the
"Salt Pit." See id. at 532-34. Another group of extraordinary rendition victims, led by Bi-
nyam Mohamed, also brought suit alleging they had been rendered and tortured by the
CIA. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1129-30 (N.D. Cal.
2008).
182. The El-Masri suit initially named "the following defendants: (1) former Director of
the CIA George Tenet, (2) certain unknown agents of the CIA (John Does 1-10), (3) PETS,
(4) ACL, (5) Keeler and Tate Management (KTM), (6) and certain unknown employees of
the defendant corporations (John Does 11-20)." See El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 534. The
corporate defendants were alleged to have owned the aircraft used to transport El-Masri.
See id. at 534 n.5. The Mohamed suit, in contrast, named only Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., a
Boeing subsidiary, which the plaintiffs alleged "provided [the CIA with] the aircraft, flight
crews, and the flight and logistical support necessary" to carry out renditions. See Mo-
hamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
183. 437 F. Supp. 2d. at 537.
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state secrets privilege. 18 4 After successful interposition of the
state secrets doctrine, both courts held that the suits could no
longer continue as they would risk exposing important national
security interests and dismissed both claims outright.8 5
This doctrine presents an enormous obstacle in any extraordi-
nary rendition litigation: the government can keep secret its
clandestine national security operations, and any violation of law
occurring as a result is largely unenforceable in a private context.
4. Political Questions and Separation of Powers
Perhaps the most glaring issue, even if all the other problems
were overcome, is that the federal judiciary is extremely reluctant
to adjudicate disputes that it feels should properly be resolved by
other branches of government. This reluctance is especially acute
184. 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1134. The Mohamed court incorporated CIA Director Hayden's
publicly available declaration filed in the case:
First, this lawsuit puts at issue whether or not Jeppesen assisted the CIA
with any of the alleged detention and interrogation .... Disclosure of infor-
mation that would tend to confirm or deny whether or not Jeppesen provided
such assistance-even if such confirmations or denial [sic] come from a pri-
vate party alleged to have cooperated with the United States and not the
United States itself-would cause exponentially grave damage to the national
security by disclosing whether or not the CIA utilizes particular sources and
methods and, thus, revealing to foreign adversaries information about the
CIA's intelligence capabilities or lack thereof.
Second, this lawsuit puts at issues [sic] whether or not the CIA cooperated
with particular foreign governments in the conduct of alleged clandestine in-
telligence activities. Adducing evidence that would tend to confirm or deny
such allegations would result in extremely grave damage to the foreign rela-
tions and foreign activities of the United States.
Id. at 1135. Both judges received a classified declaration from Director Hayden in addition
to the general public declaration quoted above. See id.; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d. at 537.
This declaration was a more "detailed explanation of the facts and reasons underlying the
assertion of the privilege." El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 537.
185. See Mohamed, 539 F. Supp. 2d at 1135; El-Masri, 437 F. Supp. 2d at 539. El-Masri
appealed the dismissal of his suit to the Fourth Circuit, which affirmed the District
Court's dismissal based on the state secrets doctrine. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d
296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court denied certiorari in El-Masri's final appeal,
effectively affirming the dismissal of El-Masri's complaint under the state secrets doctrine.
See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 373
(2007). The plaintiffs in Mohamed have appealed to the Ninth Circuit, see Brief of Plain-
tiffs-Appellants, Mohamed v. United States ex rel. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., No. 08-15693
(9th Cir. Sept. 26, 2008), which recently declined to extend El-Masri's state secrets analy-
sis to the National Security Agency's Terrorist Surveillance Program, but also noted that
dismissal based on the state secrets doctrine may have been appropriate in the extraordi-
nary rendition context. See A1-Haramain Islamic Found., Inc. v. Bush, 507 F.3d 1190,
1200-01 (9th Cir. 2007).
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in the foreign policy and national security context and has been
expressed and applied in extraordinary rendition litigation.
As primarily discussed in Arar v. Ashcroft, a lawsuit involving
the extraordinary rendition of Canadian citizen Maher Arar from
a New York airport to Syria, the political question doctrine can
override the entire legal process." 6 Recognizing the inherent limi-
tations of the federal judiciary, the district court judge analyzed
the political question issue:
This case undoubtedly presents broad questions touching on the role
of the Executive branch in combating terrorist forces-namely the
prevention of future terrorist attacks within U.S. borders by captur-
ing or containing members of those groups who seek to inflict dam-
age on this country and its people. Success in these efforts requires
coordination between law enforcement and foreign-policy officials;
complex relationships with foreign governments are also involved. In
light of these factors, courts must proceed cautiously in reviewing
constitutional and statutory claims in that arena, especially where
they raise policy-making issues that are the prerogative of coordi-
nate branches of government.
Second, this case raises crucial national-security and foreign policy
considerations, implicating "the complicated multilateral negotia-
tions concerning efforts to halt international terrorism." The proprie-
ty of these considerations, including supposed agreements between
the United States and foreign governments regarding intelligence-
gathering in the context of the efforts to combat terrorism, are most
appropriately reserved to the Executive and Legislative branches of
government. Moreover, the need for much secrecy can hardly be
doubted.
In sum, whether the policy be seeking to undermine or overthrow
foreign governments, or rendition, judges should not, in the absence
of explicit direction by Congress, hold officials who carry out such
policies liable for damages even if such conduct violates our treaty
obligations or customary international law.
187
While certainly recognizing legitimate concerns over political and
foreign relations and separation of powers issues, this theory al-
186. 414 F. Supp. 2d 250 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Although analyzed in the context of a Bivens
claim, the court's discussion can readily be transferred to any number of contexts in which
aliens allege that the United States violated international law in situations like extraordi-
nary rendition.
187. Id. at 281-83 (internal citations omitted). The Second Circuit approved of this
analysis on appeal, noting the established policy of deference to executive branch officials
when dealing with foreign policy and intelligence issues. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d
157, 181-83 (2d Cir. 2008).
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lows the court to sidestep analysis of an extraordinary rendition
claim regardless of whether "such conduct violates our treaty ob-
ligations or customary international law."
188
The Supreme Court in Sosa adopted a similar limitation when
determining which violations of the "law of nations" the ATS
should recognize. 189 It held that "the determination whether a
norm is sufficiently definite to support a cause of action should
(and, indeed, inevitably must) involve an element of judgment
about the practical consequences of making that cause available
to litigants in the federal courts.""19 Confirming what it implied
by this sentence, the Court continued in a footnote that "[a]nother
possible limitation that we need not apply here is a policy of case-
specific deference to the political branches... [in which] there is
a strong argument that federal courts should give serious weight
to the Executive Branch's view of the case's impact on foreign pol-
icy."'191 Even a clearly-defined norm such as torture is then subject
to this "practical consequences" inquiry, which, in all likelihood,
would result in the same outcome as Arar.
Accordingly, plaintiffs who overcome prior hurdles will have a
difficult time arguing around the government's proverbial trump
card, by which it can claim that national security and foreign pol-
icy actions-like extraordinary renditions-are properly left to
the executive branch, despite the fact that they violate interna-
tional law.
C. The Effect of the Problems
As demonstrated throughout this part, extraordinary rendition
plaintiffs face unrealistic obstacles when they sue the United
States or its agents for their injuries. As a result of the various
legal arguments the United States can invoke, which are wholly
unrelated to the substantive rights protected by binding customa-
ry and treaty law, not a single extraordinary rendition claim has
had a trial on the merits in the United States. Coupled with the
lack of international and institutional enforcement discussed in
Part IV, these domestic legal principles allow the United States to
188. Arar, 414 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
189. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004).
190. Id. at 732-33.
191. Id. at 733 n.21.
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escape accountability in victims' courts of last resort for the Unit-
ed States' violations of clearly established international law
stemming from several binding sources.
VI. A THREEFOLD SOLUTION
As discussed above, extraordinary rendition victims have
turned to American courts as a result of the lack of international
enforcement. 192 Once there, however, several domestic legal prin-
ciples have foreclosed their claims before they got off the
ground.193 As a result, many extraordinary rendition victims are
left empty-handed, and even those later declared innocent are
without a remedy. Because domestic courts have turned into vic-
tims' last resort, those courts should be able to decide the claims
properly in front of them through a reasonable legal process.
This part will sketch a brief overview of a potential process
that would not only address these claims, but also ensure that ex-
traordinary rendition stops as a policy matter as well. The pro-
posal will provide a limited framework under the ATS, extending
only to extraordinary rendition victims.' It does not seek to re-
solve all detainee mistreatment issues in the broader war against
terror; rather, its focus is to resolve the claims and issues specifi-
cally discussed throughout this note. By doing so, this proposal
also takes advantage of ATS precedent, which is steadily increas-
ing thanks to recent international human rights litigation.
As noted, the proposed interdependent roles must not only
function together to address current claims but must also end the
extraordinary rendition program as a policy matter. While the
program's current activity level is unclear, executive branch lead-
ers and agency officials in the Bush Administration showed no
signs that they intended to stop it.' 9 ' Officials consistently denied
192. See supra Part V.
193. See supra Part V.B.
194. The ATS, as discussed above in Part V.A, is the most viable foundation on which
to construct a cause of action here. It is already narrowly tailored, applying only to aliens
and to well-recognized violations of international law. Further, it does not unnecessarily
implicate other uses and does not risk foreclosing valid causes of action based on a variety
of other procedural or jurisdictional defenses relating to domestic law, such as the consti-
tutional questions implicated in trying to extend Bivens claims to meet the situation. For
more on the various difficulties of other causes of action, see supra note 148.
195. See, e.g., RESPONSE TO COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE, supra note 115, art. 3, para.
16 (noting that the United States has long used rendition to combat terrorism, but insist-
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that the United States rendered suspects to countries where tor-
ture was more likely than not to occur, and they stood by the pro-
gram generally.196 Moreover, it seems that the Obama Adminis-
tration will retain renditions as a counterterrorism tool, despite
shuttering the CIA's "black sites." '197 But even if its use is waning,
the program has claimed many victims, at least a handful of
whom have since been declared innocent. 198 Accordingly, the pro-
posed solution will provide a private remedy for victims, and also
ensure that extraordinary renditions do not continue in the fu-
ture. The aim is not to compensate terrorists who want to harm
the United States, but rather to deter future extraordinary rendi-
tions by ensuring that the United States can apprehend a sus-
pected terrorist using legal means.
A. The Executive
The executive branch has designed, implemented, and carried
out the extraordinary rendition program. As such, the executive's
role in eliminating extraordinary renditions as a policy matter is
the most important of the three branches. With only tepid or no
support so far for extraordinary rendition victims in the other two
branches, 199 the executive must play the lead role in reforming
the program.
Initially, executive branch and agency leaders must reverse the
policy course of the last several years and refuse to use extraordi-
nary rendition as a tool in the continued war against terror. They
should enforce this directive throughout the executive branch and
the CIA. As the executive branch has been the impetus behind
this program,2 °° a top-down approach starting with the President
is the most important step in its elimination.
ing that it abides by all relevant laws).
196. See id. art. 3, para. 13 ("[W]here the United States conducts renditions of individ-
uals, the United States does not transport anyone to a country if the United States be-
lieves he or she will be tortured."); see also ON THE RECORD, supra note 60, at 4-5 (collect-
ing public statements from government officials supporting the rendition program).
197. See Greg Miller, CIA Retains Power To Abduct; Obama Preserves the Rendition
Program, A Counter-terrorism Tool Whose Role, Officials Say, Might Expand, L.A. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2009, at Al.
198. See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 68, at 381-84.
199. See supra text accompanying notes 115-27 (discussing Congress's interpretation
of Article 3 of the CAT); supra Part V (discussing extraordinary rendition victims' lack of
success in United States federal courts).
200. See supra Part I.
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Instead of continuing the CIA's extraordinary renditions, the
executive must use only legal means to pursue the fight against
international terrorists. This includes abiding by the CAT and re-
fusing to send suspected terrorists to foreign countries to be tor-
tured for intelligence. Moreover, the executive branch must en-
sure that the CIA abides by all domestic and international laws
controlling its treatment of suspects and detainees.
Finally, to the extent that the executive retains the extraordi-
nary rendition program, it should use rendition only in its origi-
nal form by returning suspected terrorists to countries in which
they are wanted through a legitimate legal process.201 Even in
this process, the executive branch must ensure reliably that the
suspect will not be tortured upon his return.20 2
As a further check on the executive's power, and as a method of
accountability, the executive branch should acknowledge that it
will defer to Congress's new legislation proposed infra2 ' and that
the judiciary may decide such claims without case-by-case defe-
rence to the executive branch. This acknowledgement would allow
a proper claim to reach a judge despite the executive's opposition,
negating the Supreme Court's discussion in Sosa regarding the
practical consequences of deference to the executive when making
a cause of action available under the ATS.2 °4 In that way, the leg-
islature and judiciary can ensure that the executive is not contin-
uing to use extraordinary rendition, and can hold it accountable if
it does.
The executive branch must take the initiative and establish a
clear policy prohibiting extraordinary rendition while cooperating
with the legislative and judicial branches to ensure legitimacy
and accountability.
B. The Legislature
The legislature's role is more intertwined with the judiciary's,
but must still rely on policy support from the executive branch to
201. See supra notes 23-31 and accompanying text for a description of the original ren-
dition program.
202. Article 3 of the CAT would still apply regardless of whether there is outstanding
legal process for the suspect.
203. See infra Part VI.B.
204. See supra notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
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be truly effective. Under this proposal, Congress should pass a
narrow legislative framework for extraordinary rendition victims,
allowing them to pursue legitimate ATS claims in a proper judi-
cial forum.
This legislation would first waive the United States' sovereign
immunity specifically for extraordinary rendition suits brought
under the ATS.20 5 To make this proposal both focused and more
politically palatable, the legislation should waive only sovereign
%immunity for two types of suits: those brought under the ATS al-
leging that the United States clandestinely rendered the plaintiff
from a foreign country to a third country where he claims he was
tortured; and those brought under the ATS alleging that the
United States rendered a plaintiff from a foreign country to
another foreign location operated directly by the CIA, where he
claims he was tortured.
In terms of focus, the legislation's structure limits itself to the
basic premise of extraordinary rendition without potentially in-
cluding immigration disputes and other irrelevant claims. As far
as making the approach more politically palatable, this limited
waiver of sovereign immunity would make the United States lia-
ble only for directly torturing suspects or delivering them to a
third country knowing that country would torture them. Further,
the complicity liability aspect closely mirrors Article 3 of the CAT,
but does not involve making that provision of the CAT self-
executing. As such, the customary international laws against tor-
ture, as well as complicity liability for the same, will cover largely
the same issues as the CAT without having to alter the imple-
mentation of the treaty itself.
The most important issue in developing this framework is
maintaining the inherent secrecy of the CIA's intelligence-
gathering methods, as recognized by the El-Masri and Jeppesen
courts' invocation of the state secrets doctrine.2 °6 Because the in-
formation on which plaintiffs must rely to prove their claims is
classified, Congress should create a specialized forum to hear
these claims. The forum's structure may be loosely modeled after
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court ("FISC). 2 °7 Like the
205. See supra Part V.B.1.
206. See supra Part V.B.3.
207. 50 U.S.C. § 1803 (2006).
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FISC, this specialized court would rely on rotating federal district
court judges in each federal circuit to hear the victims' claims in
partially sealed proceedings.0 8 State secrets would be divulged
only to the extent necessary to resolve the immediate claim, and
only the portions of the trial relying on classified information
would be sealed.2 9 Losing parties could appeal to a higher body
that could overturn a liability decision based on classified infor-
mation, similar to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of
Review. 210 For any ruling based on unclassified information,
plaintiffs can appeal to the federal circuit court of appeals in their
jurisdiction. Finally, like the FISC's structure, a losing party
could appeal any liability decision to the Supreme Court of the
United States under seal.21' The Supreme Court, as it does in its
regular docket, would have discretion in whether to hear the case,
in addition to any unclassified disputes in cases that arise
through the normal appellate procedure. Given the nature of the
proceeding, the legislation would require a bench trial with no
jury election.
Congress also should clarify that it intends for this forum to be
the proper dispute resolution system for any ATS claims arising
out of the CIA's publicly acknowledged rendition program. This
pronouncement would cover not only the focus of this note-
renditions to a third country implicating the United States under
a complicity liability theory-but also those instances in which
the CIA detained suspects itself. By acknowledging this forum in
conjunction with the executive, Congress would specifically grant
the judiciary the right to hear and decide these cases, which the
political question doctrine currently prevents.1 2 Thus, by creating
an appropriate forum that is legitimized by the executive's defe-
rence to it, Congress can create a functional system to ensure
that extraordinary renditions stop.
C. The Judiciary
To complete this proposal, the judiciary must implement and
administer fairly the specialized courts Congress will create.
208. Id. § 1803(a) (Supp. V. 2007).
209. See infra Part VI.C.
210. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(b) (2006).
211. Id.
212. See supra Part V.B.4.
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Judges must be able to determine fairly when a plaintiff has a le-
gitimate claim against the United States, as federal judges do in
many other situations. Given Congress's legislation and the ex-
ecutive's deference to the courts, the judiciary should resolve
faithfully the claims brought before it.
Of course, proper mechanisms should be implemented to en-
sure any classified information remains between the parties and
the tribunal. As noted above, only portions of the trial involving
classified information should be sealed. Further, all lawyers prac-
ticing, or anyone else appearing, in front of the court during the
classified portions must receive the proper security clearance.
This presents a unique problem for plaintiffs, as they will almost
certainly be rejected for such clearance because they are often
suspected terrorists. One solution may be to create a specialized,
but limited, bar that would be licensed to practice in front of
these courts. Plaintiffs could bring their claims before the court,
and the members of the specialized bar would collaborate with
the plaintiffs' outside attorneys. The lawyers holding the proper
security clearance could argue and brief the classified portions of
the case, while the plaintiffs' outside attorneys could handle the
remainder.2 13 No classified information could pass to the plaintiff
or his outside lawyer except information regarding the specific
outcome of the classified portions-whether the United States is
liable for a substantive violation of international law under the
ATS. Written opinions would be redacted similarly to the extent
necessary.
Revealing only the narrow decision of liability should not com-
promise classified information. Many government leaders and
agents have acknowledged that the rendition program exists. 214 A
federal judge's finding stating solely that, based on all the rele-
vant circumstances, the United States rendered an individual to
a country, knowing that he probably would have been, and in fact
was, tortured does not divulge any further classified information.
Neither the details of the program nor any other substantive in-
formation would be revealed to the public. Given the govern-
213. For instance, the United States may assert a statute of limitations defense or oth-
er procedural issue. It may further dispute the amount of damages to which the plaintiff is
entitled or argue that the plaintiff had preexisting mental or physical conditions. Before or
after the sealed liability portion, the plaintiffs outside attorney could handle these unclas-
sified portions of the case.
214. See, e.g., ON THE RECORD, supra note 160, at 4-5.
1172 [Vol. 43:1135
EXTRAORDINARY RENDITIONS
ment's acknowledgement of the rendition program, the liability
decision would focus primarily on whether the United States
knew the suspect was likely to be tortured. The judge could base
his determination on ample public information, including the
State Department's own Country Reports, as well as classified in-
formation that would not be revealed publicly. To the extent that
case law treats any of this information as classified and non-
justiciable under the state secrets doctrine,215 the statutory
framework should carve out a specific exception and allow disclo-
sure only to the extent necessary to decide the issue of substan-
tive liability. With the executive branch's cooperation and con-
gressional legislation, the judiciary would hold both other
branches accountable for any continuing extraordinary renditions
by enforcing international law in a private context.
This proposal would create a limited context in which extraor-
dinary rendition victims can seek relief for past wrongs. In addi-
tion, if each branch faithfully executes its role, extraordinary
renditions as a governmental policy will stop. Further, the United
States will bring itself back in line with its international legal ob-
ligations and regain its moral high ground in the war against ter-
ror.
VII. CONCLUSION
For years, the United States has been able to avoid meaningful
accountability for violations of established international law
committed in the CIA's extraordinary rendition program after
9/11. Although there have been political and practical ramifica-
tions on the international level, individual victims of this pro-
gram are left without any redress. The international dispute reso-
lution system has yet to enforce the United States' breaches of its
treaty obligations, and American jurisprudence and courts, which
have turned into victims' last resorts, effectively have foreclosed
any relief despite substantive violations of customary and treaty-
based international law. As a result, extraordinary rendition vic-
tims are left without a remedy in many instances. Clearly, some-
thing must change. And while it may not eliminate the United
215. See, e.g., Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 539 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1133 (N.D.
Cal. 2008) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 10 (1953)); El-Masri v. Tenet,
437 F. Supp. 2d 530, 536-37 (E.D. Va. 2006) (quoting United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S.
1, 10 (1953)).
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States' various other legal and moral dilemmas in the war on ter-
ror, a workable solution across all three branches of government
that addresses current legal claims and ends the extraordinary
rendition program is a good start in righting these wrongs.
Robert Johnson
